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Abstract
This article uses a generally accepted conceptualisation of
sustainable development that can be operationalized in a
judicial context. It focuses on the individual and collective
dimensions of the environmental, economic and social pil-
lars, as well as the consideration of inter-generational and
intra-generational equity. Case law from the European, Afri-
can and American systems is analysed to reveal if the ele-
ments of sustainable development have been incorporated
in their jurisprudence. The analysis reveals that the human
rights bodies have used different interpretative methods,
some more progressive than others, in order to incorporate
the elements of sustainable development in the scope of
their mandate, even if they do not mention the concept as
such. The overall conclusion is that sustainable development
has been operationalized through human rights courts to a
certain extent. Sometimes, however, a purely individualised
approach to human rights creates a hurdle to further
advance sustainable development. The conclusion creates
the impression that sustainable development is not just a
concept on paper, but that it in fact can be operationalized,
also in other courts and quasi-courts. Moreover, it shows
that the institutional structure of human rights courts has
been used in other areas than pure human rights protection,
which means that other areas of law might make use of it to
fill the gap of a non-existing court structure.
Keywords: Operationalizing sustainable development,
human rights, individual rights/interests, collective rights/
interests, human rights courts
1 Introduction
[T]he rigid maintenance of [the individual] approach
[to human rights] contributes to the ‘stagnation’ of inter-
national law, and more particularly to the confinement
of the idea of ‘human rights’ within an individualistic
horizon, which remains blind to the intrinsic linkage
* PhD Candidate in public international law, Erasmus University Rotter-
dam. The author would like to thank Prof. Ellen Hey, Prof. Klaus Heine
and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable insights and construc-
tive comments on the drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
between the individual and the collective interests of soci-
ety.1
Human rights have traditionally emphasised the protec-
tion of individual rights against state action. Environ-
mental protection and the process of development, on
the other hand, reflect rights and/or interests of the col-
lective, which may or may not correspond with individ-
ual human rights. For a couple of decades, the line
between individual and collective interests has been
blurred and human rights courts have increasingly been
faced with both individual and collective dimensions of
certain human rights in the context of environmental
protection and development. The primary question for
this article is how these courts are dealing with the
potentially incompatible collective and individual
approaches to human rights – both of which are relevant
to the pursuit of sustainable development.
This article will shortly present a somewhat generally
accepted conceptualisation of sustainable development,
which entails the balancing of the environmental, eco-
nomic and social ‘pillars’, as well as consideration of
inter-generational and intra-generational equity.2 The
emphasis, however, will be on how human rights courts
have reasoned around these five elements and the indi-
vidual and collective dimensions thereof. The analysis
includes cases from the European Court of Human
Rights (hereinafter ‘the European Court’ or ‘the
Court’), the African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights (hereinafter ‘the African Commission’ or
‘the Commission’), and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Inter-American Court’
or ‘the Court’). Even though cases from the different
systems cannot be compared in terms of substance, due
to, inter alia, the difference in applicable law, the judi-
cial reasoning and the interpretative methods of the dif-
ferent dispute-settlement bodies will be compared.
1. F. Francioni, ‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’,
21 The European Journal of International Law 1 at 44 (2010).
2. D. MCGoldrick, ‘Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Inte-
grated Conception’, 45 Sustainable Development and Human Rights at
797-801 (1996). E. Brown Weiss, ‘In Fairness to Future Generations and
Sustainable Development’, 8 American University Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Policy at 26 (1992).
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2 Individual and Collective
Dimensions of Sustainable
Development
The concept of sustainable development was coined and
defined by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 as
‘development that meets the needs of the present gener-
ation without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs’.3 This definition is nowa-
days generally accepted and the idea of bridging envi-
ronmental protection and development has been
emphasised repeatedly at international conferences,4 as
well as in international and regional legal instruments
3. G.H. Brundtland (World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment), Our Common Future (1987), at 43.
4. In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Johannesburg in 2002 and in Rio de Janeiro
again in 2012 (the ‘Rio+20’ Conference). See, e.g., Report of the Uni-
ted Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (1992). See
also P.H. Sand, ‘UNCED and the Development of International Environ-
mental Law’, 8 National Resources & Environmental Law (1992-1993),
P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2002),
at 82-82; and M. Sanwal, ‘Trends in Global Environmental Governance:
The Emergence of a Mutual Supportiveness Approach to Achieve Sus-
tainable Development’, 4 Global Environmental Politics at 17 (2004).
and court jurisprudence.5 The history, the aim, and the
legal status of sustainable development have been dis-
cussed in numerous writings and will therefore be kept
to a minimum in this article.6
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment defined sustainable development as follows.
Principle 3:
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to
equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations.
Principle 4:
In order to achieve sustainable development, envi-
ronmental protection shall constitute an integral part
5. P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2002),
at 84; M-C. Cordonier Segger, ‘The Role of International Forums in the
Advancement of Sustainable Development’, 10 Sustainable Develop-
ment Law & Policy at 14-17 (2009), N. Schrijver, The Evolution of Sus-
tainable Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and
Status (2008), at 24, 100, D. Shelton, ‘The Environmental Jurisprudence
of International Human Rights Tribunals’, in R. Picolotti and J.D. Taillant
(eds.), Linking Human Rights and the Environment 1 (2003), at 41; and
P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law: Volume I,
Frameworks, Standards, Implementation (1995), at 170. International/
regional legal instruments: Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation, signed in Marrakech on 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154,
33 ILM 1144, Preamble, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Europe-
an Union, O.J. 2010 C 83/16, Preamble, North American Free Trade
Agreement, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993), Preamble, Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11
December 1997, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/L.7/Add.1, 37 ILM 22 (1998),
Security Council resolution on the reconstruction of Iraq, 22 May 2003,
UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), § 8(e). Court cases, e.g., ICJ: Gačíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September
1997, ICJ Reports 1997, at 7. For comments, see Birnie and Boyle
(2002), above n. 5, at 96 and P. Sands, Principles of International Envi-
ronmental Law (2003), at 254-255, 263, A.E. Boyle, ‘New Law in Old
Bottles’, in J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), Yearbook of International
Environmental Law (1998), at 18; P. Sands (1995), above n. 5, at 205;
B.E. Hill, S. Wolfson and N. Targ, ‘Human Rights and the Environment:
A Synopsis and Some Predictions’, 16 The Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review, at 359 (2003-2004) and R. Kemp and
S. Parto, ‘Governance for Sustainable Development: Moving from
Theory to Practice’, 18 International Journal of Sustainable Develop-
ment 1/2, at 12 (2005). Many scholars have elaborated on the contes-
ted legal status of sustainable development, J.S. Dryzek, ‘Paradigms and
Discourses’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law (2007), at 56. Amongst
others, G. Handl, ‘Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Spe-
cific Obligations’, in W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and Inter-
national Law (1995); P. Sands, ‘Sustainable Development: Treaty, Cus-
tom, and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, in A. Boyle and
D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development
(1999), D.B. Magraw and L.D. Hawke, ‘Sustainable Development’, in
D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law (2007); and N. Schrijver, The Evolu-
tion of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception,
Meaning and Status (2008).
6. See inter alia A. Kiss, ‘Sustainable Development and Human Rights’, in
A.A.C. Trindade (ed.), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and
Environment (1995), at 36; Sands (2003), above n. 5, at 296 and
D. Shelton, ‘General Developments’, in G. Handl (ed.), Yearbook of
International Environmental Law (1996), at 177; U. Möller, ‘Sustaina-
bility: Expectations and Reality’, in K. Feiler (ed.), Sustainability Creates
New Prosperity: Basis for a New World Order, New Economics and
Environmental Protection (2004), at 19-20; and C. Mitcham, ‘The Con-
cept of Sustainable Development: Its Origins and Ambivalence’, 17
Technology in Society 3, at 311 (1995), at 314-315; N. Schrijver, The
Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception,
Meaning and Status (2008); P. Sands (1995), above n. 5.
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of the development process and cannot be considered
in isolation from it.7
Thus, the aim of sustainable development is to balance
environmental, economic and social interests, as well as
consider the impact on future generations (inter-genera-
tional equity) and on vulnerable groups in the society
(intra-generational equity).8 This gives rise to a number
of potential conflicts between various collective and
individual interests. The clash between rights and inter-
ests is something courts deal with on a daily basis, and
judges can therefore give concrete strength to sustaina-
ble development by reasoning around its elements and
illustrate how the interests can be accounted for, includ-
ing the ones that are not given priority.9 As the follow-
ing chapter of this article will illustrate, the elements of
sustainable development have made their way into the
reasoning of human rights courts, even where the courts
do not have an explicit mandate to ‘apply’ the concept.
Judges can hence operationalise sustainable develop-
ment even if there is no unanimity among states on the
exact meaning or legal status of the concept.10 The rea-
soning of the court explains why certain acts are or are
not in compliance with the treaty and reveals how the
court has balanced the opposing rights and/or interests.
An example being that a state limits an individual’s right
to property through prohibiting extraction of natural
resources (the economic pillar) in order to protect the
environment (the environmental pillar). Such an act
limits the individual right, but might be legitimately
justified by its aim and by reimbursing the economic
loss through providing the individual with economic
compensation.11 The five elements of sustainable devel-
opment will now be presented separately, although it
should be pointed out that they are closely related in
terms of causes and effects.
2.1 The Environmental Pillar
Environmental protection has received a lot of attention
since the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environ-
ment in Stockholm. The right to a clean environment
can now be found in over a hundred constitutions
around the globe, and there are numerous multilateral
environmental agreements and expert groups at an
international level.12 Healthy ecosystems and diversity
of species not only have intrinsic value in themselves,
but are also closely related to human health and well-
being. As people form part of ecosystems, their actions
directly and indirectly affect the environment and
changes in ecosystems consequently change the condi-
7. UNCED Report (1992), Annex 1.
8. A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Devel-
opment (1999), at 16-17.
9. V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, in
A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable
Development (1999), at 36-37.
10. Lowe, above n. 9, at 36-37.
11. See Section 3.1.2.
12. Sands (2003), above n. 5, at 296 and Shelton (1996), above n. 6, at
177.
tions for human well-being.13 The right to a clean envi-
ronment is by nature an interest of the collective, as the
environmental health affects people beyond the individ-
ual sphere and other borders. This does not preclude an
individual dimension of the environmental pillar. Envi-
ronmental destruction may affect certain individuals in a
very severe and concrete manner, while the general pub-
lic do not suffer, at least not in the present or near
future. The environmental pillar in the context of
human rights protection has been represented by e.g.
protection against environmental destruction due to
industrial pollution, deforestation, or non-sustainable
extraction of resources.14
2.2 The Economic Pillar
The economic and social pillars are often combined in
the context of sustainable development and then refer-
red to as socioeconomic development.15 In the frame-
work of this article, however, it is important to point out
that there is a significant difference between the eco-
nomic and social pillars. The economic pillar is connec-
ted to economic growth, profit and efficiency.16 Also the
economic pillar has individual and collective dimensions
that may or may not strive towards the same goal. The
involvement of people and companies in developmental
activities tend to be driven by individual economic
interests in profit making.17 Such activities may, howev-
er, lead to economic growth, which is of great interest
for the collective well-being. In this regard, private
companies play a pivotal role and it could be argued that
economic growth and development would not occur
without them.18 While profit-driven companies are
forced to make decisions based on their individual eco-
nomic interests, it has become increasingly important
for companies to develop and maintain a positive repu-
tation. Therefore, companies tend to include the collec-
tive dimension of the economic pillar, as well as envi-
13. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, ‘Ecosystems and Human Well-
Being’ (2005), available at: <http://www.millenniumassessment.org/
documents/document.356.aspx.pdf> (last visited 26 Aug. 2013), at v-
vi.
14. See Chapter 3.
15. E.g., X. Fuentes ‘International Law-Making in the Field of Sustainable
Development: The Unequal Competition between Development and
the Environment’, 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics,
Law and Economics, at 109 (2002). The existence of a legally binding
right to development is also highly contested, see, e.g., A.A.C. Trin-
dade, ‘Environment and Development: Formulation and Implementa-
tion of the Right to Development as a Human Right’, in A.A.C. Trin-
dade (ed.), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and Environment
(1995), at 64-65; Boyle and Freestone (1999), above n. 8, at 11-12,
Birnie and Boyle (2002), above n. 5, at 87; and C. Tomuschat, Human
Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (2008), at 55.
16. S. Marks, ‘The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and
Reality’, 17 Harvard Human Rights Journal at 138 (2004).
17. Marks (2004), above n. 16, at 146.
18. Marks (2004), above n. 16, at 144, Q.K. Ahmad, ‘On Sustainable
Development and All That’, 3 Brown Journal of World Affairs at
206-208 (1996).
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ronmental and social considerations in the calculation.19
The right to property and the general interest in eco-
nomic growth typically represents the economic pillar in
the context of human rights.
2.3 The Social Pillar
An anthropocentric approach to sustainable develop-
ment can be found in the 1992 Rio Declaration, whose
Principle 1 declares that ‘Human beings are at the cen-
tre of concerns for sustainable development. They are
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony
with nature.’20 This, however, does not preclude con-
siderations of the other two pillars, as acknowledgement
of the economic and environmental pillars is crucial for
the attainment of human well-being. Without a decent
environment and economic enhancement, human needs
and wants cannot be accommodated.21 The individual
dimension of the social pillar is well protected by human
rights documents, and it includes a wide array of rights,
including the most basic right to life, as well as religious
freedom and the right to private and family life. The
social pillar is represented not only by civil and political
rights, but also by matters related to human dignity and
basic human needs in the context of work, education
and improved health. These human rights are tradition-
ally thought of as individual rights, but the collective
dimension of them should be pointed out. The right to
religion, for instance, includes a freedom to worship in
community with others, and improved education and
health facilities promote the interests of the collective.
There are, moreover, human rights that are collective by
nature, namely, the rights and freedoms of social and
cultural minorities.22 The more collective dimensions of
19. On the importance of Corporate Social Responsibility principles, see, for
instance, <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinci-
ples/> (last visited 26 Aug. 2013). On credit risk management for
determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in
project finance, see also <http://www.equator-principles.com/> (last
visited 26 Aug. 2012).
20. See also Sands (2003), above n. 5, at 293.
21. D. Tladi, Towards a Nuanced Conceptualization of Sustainable Devel-
opment in International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-Economic
Instruments (2007), at 81.
22. D. Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. at 368-370 (1991).
the social pillar are closely related to the principles of
inter-generational and intra-generational equity.23
After presenting the collective and individual dimen-
sions of the three pillars of sustainable development, the
following scheme can serve as further exemplifying
those dimensions.
2.4 Inter-Generational Equity
The principle of equity between current and future gen-
erations is an essential part of sustainable development
and it crosscuts the three pillars.24 Inter-generational
equity is frequently connected to the environmental pil-
lar, since it is often used to support the preservation of
the environment for future generations. However, the
social dimension must not be forgotten; the Brundtland
Report refers to ‘the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs’ (emphasis added).25 It is conse-
quently up to the future generations to determine what
their needs might be and the duty of present generations
is to make sure that the environment is left in the best
possible condition to make sure that future generations
can fulfil that choice. Hence, the principle also refers to,
e.g., sustainable extraction of resources, which protects
the economic interests of future generations.26 That the
principle promotes collective reasoning is clear; individ-
ual rights and interests of current generations must be
considered in the light of the needs and wants of future
generations as a collective. Hence, recognition of inter-
generational equity is also recognition of a collective
dimension of the three pillars.
2.5 Intra-Generational Equity
The principle of equity between current populations
was also emphasised by the Brundtland Commission,
which recognised the ‘essential needs of the poor, to
which overriding priority should be given’.27 The over-
all aim of the principle is to promote justice between
today’s generations and not only between people in dif-
23. Tladi (2007), above n. 21, at 81. See also Birnie and Boyle (2002),
above n. 5, at 86-87 and Fuentes (2002), above n. 15.
24. E. Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity and Rights of Future Genera-
tions’ in A.A.C. Trindade (ed.), Human Rights, Sustainable Develop-
ment and Environment (1995:1); and U. Beyerlin, ‘Different Types of
Norms in International Environmental Law: Policis, Principles and Rules’,
in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée, and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law (2007), at 446; Brown Weiss (1992),
above n. 2, at 26. See also Brundtland (1987), above n. 3, at 43; and
Rio Declaration (1992), Principle 3.
25. Brundtland (1987), above n. 3, at 43, R.J. Araujo, S.J., ‘Rio+10 and the
World Summit on Sustainable Development: Why Human Beings are at
the Center of Concerns’, 2 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy
at 203-204 (2004) and Tladi (2007), above n. 21, at 46.
26. Tladi (2007), above n. 21, at 41; see also E. Brown Weiss, ‘The Planeta-
ry Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity’, 11 Ecology Law
Quarterly 4, at 495 (1984).
27. Brundtland (1987), above n. 3, at 43. See also D. Shelton, ‘Equity’ in
D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée, and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law (2007); and E. Brown Weiss, ‘Environ-
mental Equity: The Imperative for the Twenty-First Century’, in
W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law
(1995:2), at 22.
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ferent states28 but also between different communities
within states.29 The intra-generational principle focuses
on ensuring the needs of the poor, and it highlights the
importance of measures promoting distributional justice
in today’s society.30 This is not limited to enhancing the
economic situation of poor and vulnerable people, even
if economic development of a country is necessary to
meet the needs of the poor. Social and cultural values
are, however, equally important as economic benefits,
which makes the principle of intra-generational equity
closely related to both the economic and the social pil-
lars.31 The principle’s relation to the environmental pil-
lar is that inequities between people are a cause of envi-
ronmental degradation, as poverty deprives people of
environmentally sustainable choices.32 Also this princi-
ple clearly promotes the collective dimension of the pil-
lars.
3 Case Law Analysis
The case law analysis will highlight examples of how
sustainable development can be operationalised through
human rights courts. Deeper empirical evidence is not
yet available, but the following cases show a develop-
ment towards an implementation of the elements of sus-
tainable development in certain situations. In the con-
text of human rights courts, it is important to point out
that the courts do not mention the concept of sustaina-
ble development as such, that would be too politically
sensitive since the respective conventions do not entail a
28. J. Danaher, ‘Protecting the Future or Compromising the Present?: Sus-
tainable Development and the Law’, 14 Irish Student Law Review at
127-128 (2006). On the North-South discussion, see R.E. Jackson,
‘Thoughts on Sustainable Development: A Perspective from the Third
World’, 3 Brown Journal of World Affairs 2, at 215 (1996) and
A.D. Tarlock, ‘Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradox of Sustainable
Development’, 9 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, at 35 (2001).
29. Brundtland (1987), above n. 3, at 43.
30. Id.
31. E. Brown Weiss, ‘Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for
the Environment’, 84 The American Journal of International Law 1, at
201 (1990).
32. Brown Weiss (1990), above n. 31, at 201, S. Beder, ‘Costing the Earth:
Equity, Sustainable Development and Environmental Economics’, 4 New
Zeeland Journal of Environmental Law at 229 (2000).
right to sustainable development. The courts can, how-
ever, help us to deepen our understanding of sustainable
development by recognising and reasoning around the
individual and collective dimensions of the concept’s
elements described above.
3.1 The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court is not explicitly mandated to pro-
tect the environmental pillar of sustainable develop-
ment, while the economic and social pillars are embed-
ded in various provisions of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms33
(hereinafter the ‘ECHR’). The right to a clean environ-
ment has nonetheless started to crystallise in two ways.34
Firstly, a certain level of environmental quality is
required for the effective enjoyment of certain rights.
Secondly, limitations of certain rights are permitted due
to the general interest in a democratic society to protect
the environment.35 The provisions of the ECHR are
drafted in an individualistic language, intended to pro-
tect the individual against state action. As mentioned
above, however, some rights do have collective dimen-
sions and so has the general interest, which can serve as
a legitimate justification to limit certain individual
rights.
3.1.1 Protection against Environmental Destruction
Turning back to 1994 and the López Ostra case,36 where
the European Court made clear that environmental obli-
gations under the ECHR do not only cover state activi-
ties, but also cover activities carried out by private par-
ties, in this case a waste treatment plant. The Court held
33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force on 3 September 1953, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on
21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990 and
1 November 1998, respectively.
34. I have deliberately excluded cases concerning noise pollution, due to
their lack of long-term dimension. Extensively on environmental cases
and the European Court, see D. Garcia San José, Environmental Protec-
tion and the European Convention on Human Rights (2005).
35. D. García San José, ‘Environmental Protection and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights’, published by the Council of Europe, availa-
ble at <http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-
EN-HRFILES-21(2005).pdf> (last visited 26 Aug. 2013), at 8-9.
36. European Court of Human Rights: López Ostra v. Spain, Application
No. 16798/90, Judgment of 9 December 1994.
Environmental interest Economic interest Social interest
Individual dimen-
sion
Protection against severe environmental
destruction that affects the health of an
individual.
Economic interests of a compa-
ny in extraction of resources.
An individual interest in the
enjoyment of the private
sphere.
Collective dimen-
sion
Protection against diffuse environmental
degradation that does not directly affect
individuals for the time being, but that
affect e.g. fish stocks and, in the long
term, also human beings.
Economic interests of society in
having a certain industry in the
neighbourhood, e.g. for
increased work opportunities.
Cultural interests of indigenous
peoples,1 improved education
and accessibility to health facili-
ties.
1 A.A. Du Plessis and C. Rautenbach, ‘Legal Perspectives on the Role of Culture in Sustainable Development’, 13 Potchefstroom Electronic Law
Journal, at 27 (2010).
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that the environmental degradation in this case directly
obstructed the applicant’s right to private and family
life, Article 8 of the ECHR.37 The European Court sta-
ted that even if there were no grave health risks, severe
environmental pollution could nonetheless affect the
well-being of individuals and their right to effectively
enjoy their homes.38 Although recognising that states do
have a certain margin of appreciation to protect the eco-
nomic interest of the town in having a waste treatment
plant nearby, the Court nonetheless held that such
interests could not outweigh the right to private life,
referring to its ‘practical and effective’ doctrine. This
doctrine emphasises that rights are to be interpreted and
applied in a way that makes them practical and effective,
not theoretical and illusory ‘rights on paper’.39 In this
case, the right to private and family life had been ren-
dered practically ineffective, due to fume emissions,
noise and strong smells from the plant, according to the
Court.40 It therefore came to the conclusion that the
right to private and family life was violated, as Spain
had not struck a fair balance between the general inter-
est in having the waste treatment plant nearby and the
individual right.41 Four years later, the European Court
came to a similar conclusion in the Guerra and Others
case.42 Moreover, the Court held that environmental
responsibilities under Article 8 include an obligation of
State authorities to provide affected people with infor-
mation about the environmental situation that might
interfere with their private and family life. Thereby, the
European Court also recognised a procedural dimension
of the environmental pillar.43
37. European Court: López Ostra, § 49.
38. European Court: López Ostra, § 51. See also Popovic (1995-1996), at
518-519.
39. The original case where the ‘practical and effective’ doctrine was devel-
oped was Marckx v. Belgium, Application No. 6833/74, Judgment of
13 June 1979, see § 31. Other cases are Airey v. Ireland, Application
No. 6289/73, Judgment of 9 October 1979, § 24 and X and Y v. Neth-
erlands, Application No. 8978/80, Judgment of 26 March 1985, § 23.
Generally on this doctrine, see, e.g., G. Cohen-Jonathan, ‘Respect for
Private and Family Life’, in R.S. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold
(eds.), The European System for Protection of Human Rights (1993), at
409; and A. Mowbray, ‘European Convention on Human Rights: The
Issuing of Practice Directions and Recent Cases’, 4 Human Rights Law
Review at 78 (2005). On the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, see,
e.g., R.S.J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, in R.S. Macdon-
ald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for Pro-
tection of Human Rights (1993), at 103; and Y. Arai, ‘The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine in the Jurisprudence of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights’, 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human
Rights 1, at 41 (1998).
40. European Court: López Ostra, § 47.
41. European Court: López Ostra, § 58.
42. European Court: Guerra and Others v. Italy, Application No. 14967/89,
Judgment of 19 February 1998.
43. European Court: Guerra and Others, §§ 57-60. On proceduralisation of
rights, see, e.g., D.M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004), at
15-25, A. Antonelli and A Biondi, ‘Implementing the Aarhus Conven-
tion: Some Lessons from the Italian Experience’, 5 Environmental Law
Review (2003), at 170-171 and M. Gavouneli, ‘Access to Environmen-
tal Information: Delimitation of a Right’, 13 Tulane Environmental Law
Journal, at 304-306 (2000).
44. European Court: Giacomelli v. Italy, Application No. 59909/00, Judg-
ment of 2 November 2006.
Also in the Giacomelli case,44 the European Court found
a violation of Article 8, due to environmental destruc-
tion. In its assessment, the Court evaluated whether the
authorities had complied with the national environmen-
tal requirements. Since the domestic procedures on sus-
pension for facilities that did not fulfil the environmen-
tal requirements were not followed, the Court held that
it indicated that the state had failed to fulfil its obliga-
tions under Article 8.45 The European Court has hence
set national environmental standards as a measurement
of compliance with the obligations under the ECHR.
Thus, the Court is hesitant to set its own standards for
the environmental pillar and recognise that environmen-
tal protection in general is important for human well-
being. It rather relies on the Contracting Parties’ exist-
ing national standards, thereby giving them a certain
margin of appreciation as to the threshold for environ-
mental destruction to trigger protection under the
ECHR.
These cases illustrate that the European Court implicit-
ly recognises the three pillars of sustainable develop-
ment. The parameter used to include the environmental
pillar in the domain of the Court, however, is whether
or not the environmental destruction directly and severe-
ly interferes with the right to private and family life.
Such interferences, however, do not need to be physical
breaches of peoples’ homes; less concrete and physical
interferences such as fume emissions, noise and strong
smells that make the families living conditions unbeara-
ble also fall within this scope.46 The Court is hence
focused on the individual dimension of the social pillar
(direct interference with the right to private and family
life), but it also recognised the individual environmental
dimension thereof (given there is a direct link to an indi-
vidual right). The collective aspect of environmental
protection was left out of the reasoning, as well as the
intrinsic value of the environment in itself. The clash
between the individual, and potentially collective, eco-
nomic interests in the industries and economic growth
on the one hand and individual social and environmen-
tal interests on the other hand was recognised by the
European Court. The measure used to determine a fair
balance was whether or not the individual right could be
effectively enjoyed given the environmental situation
created by economic activities. In the above cases, the
fume and noise emissions from the plants were so severe
that the applicants’ living conditions became unbearable
and their right under Article 8 became practically inef-
fective.
The European Court has also constructed a link
between severe environmental destruction and the right
to life, Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court found Turkey
to be in breach of its due diligence obligations in the
case of Öneryldiz,47 since the state authorities were
responsible for the uncoordinated management of a
45. European Court: Giacomelli, §§ 87-93.
46. European Court: López Ostra, § 47 and Giacomelli, § 76.
47. European Court: Öneryldiz v. Turkey, Application No. 48939/99, Judg-
ment of 30 November 2004.
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municipal garbage tip that eventually exploded and kil-
led a number of people living in a slum adjacent to the
dump.48 Regarding Article 2, the Court highlighted the
positive obligations to ensure the right to life:
[The positive obligation] entails above all a primary
duty on the State to put in place a legislative and
administrative framework designed to provide effec-
tive deterrence against threats to the right to life …
This obligation indisputably applies in the particular
context of dangerous activities, where, in addition,
special emphasis must be placed on regulations
geared to the special features of the activity in ques-
tion, particularly with regard to the level of the
potential risk to human lives.49
The Court focused on the individual dimension of the
social pillar (the right to life), and in that context it con-
cluded that states have far-reaching positive environ-
mental obligations to ensure that the right to life is pro-
tected. Even though the Court is focusing on the indi-
vidual right, the reasoning implies that as a collective,
citizens of the Contracting Parties have a right to an
environment that does not put their lives at risk.
This case further showed that the European Court
implicitly recognises the principle of intra-generational
equity. The Court held that the seemingly voluntary
settlement next to the garbage tip in fact was not that
voluntary. The economic situation of the slum dwellers,
in conjunction with encouragement from the state
through town planning, had forced them to live in dan-
gerous areas, where the environmental situation was
eventually costing them their lives. The Court rejected
the state’s argument that the slum dwellers were respon-
sible for situating themselves at risk and inferred that
states have a far-reaching responsibility to ensure that
vulnerable people are to be protected against environ-
mental destruction. The European Court thereby recog-
nised the collective dimension of the social pillar by
highlighting the plight of the slum dwellers following
the rational of the principle of intra-generational equity.
Around the year 2000, the European Court received a
number of complaints from Russian citizens regarding
the environmental situation in Cherepovets. In its first
judgement, Fadeyeva,50 the European Court expressly
set out the general principles regarding environmental
destruction in the context of Article 8, namely,
[I]n order to fall within the scope of Article 8, com-
plaints relating to environmental nuisances have to
show, firstly, that there was an actual interference with
48. European Court: Öneryldiz, §§ 98-110.
49. European Court: Öneryldiz, §§ 89-90.
50. European Court: Fadeyeva v. Russia, Application No. 55723/00, Judg-
ment of 9 June 2005. See alsoLedyayeva, Dobrokhotova, Zolotareva
and Romashina v. Russia, Application Nos. 53157/99, 53247/99,
53695/00 and 56850/00, Judgment of 26 October 2006 and Dubetska
and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 30499/03, Judgment of 10 Feb-
ruary 2011, §§ 6, 10-11 and 73.
the applicant's private sphere, and, secondly, that a
level of severity was attained (emphasis added).51
The Court then pointed out that environmental con-
cerns were growing and that European States had adop-
ted various measures to reduce emissions and pollution
from industries, hence referring to its ‘living instru-
ment’ doctrine. This doctrine draws on the idea that the
interpretation of the ECHR provisions evolves over
time to accommodate changes in society that were not
anticipated when the Convention was drafted, such as
the increasing concerns about the environment.52 It
thereby opened up for more progressive interpretation
in the environmental field, but continued instead by
stating that states do have a wide margin of appreciation
in this field and that the Court’s role in environmental
protection is merely subsidiary. The European Court
held that it would focus its analysis on the procedural
aspects of Article 8 and only in exceptional cases consid-
ers the substantive part of the decisions taken by nation-
al authorities in environmental cases.53 Thus, the Court
made clear that it did not recognise the collective
dimension of the environmental pillar that promotes
healthy ecosystems in general, something highly rele-
vant in the pursuit of sustainable development.
Eventually, the European Court found Russia to be in
violation of Article 8, as the air pollution levels exceeded
the national environmental standards and the justifica-
tions put forward by the state did not strike a fair bal-
ance between the individual right and the community
interest.54 In its assessment, the Court found that the air
pollution without doubt adversely affected the appli-
cant’s quality of life.55 Direct interferences with individ-
ual rights must be ‘in accordance with the law’, but as
the plant was privately owned, the state did not directly
interfere with the applicant’s right. The state nonethe-
less has positive obligations and ‘domestic legality
should be approached not as a separate and conclusive
test, but rather as one of many aspects which should be
taken into account in assessing whether the State has
struck a “fair balance” in accordance with Article 8 §
2.’56 The European Court found the contribution of the
steel plant to the economic system of the region consti-
tuted a legitimate aim in the meaning of Article 8 § 2,
51. European Court: Fadeyeva, § 70.
52. The original case for this interpretation method was Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, Application No. 5856/72, Judgment of 25 April 1978, § 31
and repeated in, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No.
14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, § 102, Loizidou v. Turkey, Appli-
cation No. 15318/89, Judgment of 23 March 1995, § 71 and Matthews
v. United Kingdom, Application No. 24833/94, Judgment of 18 Febru-
ary 1999, § 39. See also Mowbray (2005), above n. 59, at 60-61,
F. Matscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’, in
R.S. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold (eds.), The European Sys-
tem for Protection of Human Rights (1993), at 68; and G. Letsas, ‘The
ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’, (2012),
available at <http:// papers .ssrn .com/ sol3/ papers .cfm ?abstract_ id=
2021836> (last visited 27 Aug. 2013).
53. European Court: Fadeyeva, §§ 103-105.
54. European Court: Fadeyeva, § 134.
55. European Court: Fadeyeva, § 88.
56. European Court: Fadeyeva, § 101.
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but the recourse sought by the applicant in national
courts was ineffective and the state did not provide her
with any alternative solution to enable her to move away
from the dangerous area.57 Her individual right to pri-
vate and family life was hence rendered ineffective and
the individual and collective economic interest of having
the steel plant in the region could not justify that.58
Moreover, the Court recognised the intra-generational
equity dimension in the Fadeyeva case. It observed that
the applicant probably did not have the possibility to
move from the hazardous area, as she had very limited
financial resources. Therefore, the states were expected
to take further measures to ensure that the applicant’s
right to private and family life was ensured, in line with
the ‘practical and effective’ doctrine.59 This can be com-
pared to the Guerra and Others case, where the Court
held that distribution of environmental information suf-
ficed to fulfil the due diligence obligations under Article
8.60 Even though the European Court is hesitant to give
the environmental pillar explicit support, its focus on
the ‘practical and effective’ side of the social pillar does
translate into a certain degree of environmental protec-
tion. However, it is clear that the issue for the Court is
not the environmental destruction as such; the power
plant may continue to contaminate as long as people are
not negatively affected by it.
In the Kyrtatos case,61 the European Court reiterated its
findings in López Ostra and stated that severe environ-
mental degradation can affect individuals’ private
sphere even if it does not endanger their health, as long
as such degradation can be directly linked to an individ-
ual’s home. The Court found no such link in the present
case, although it recognised that the surroundings might
have been severely damaged by the illegal draining of a
wetland adjacent to the applicants’ home, including
damage to birds and protected species.62 With regard to
this case, Francioni argues,
The paradoxical result of this decision is that the
preservation of the environment from the attack
caused by illegal activities depends on the interfer-
ence that such illegal activities produce in the private
life of individuals. A different approach would have
been preferable. The Court could have given more
weight to the illegal character of the environmental
destruction and interpreted Article 8 more liberally
so as to consider the applicants legitimate stakehold-
ers in the management of natural resources which
were not only part of their extended [emphasis added]
home and private life but, more importantly, consti-
tuted a public environmental good affecting the col-
lective life of the people living in and around the area.63
57. European Court: Fadeyeva, §§ 123, 132-133.
58. European Court: Fadeyeva, § 117.
59. European Court: Fadeyeva, §§ 120-132.
60. European Court: Guerra and Others, § 60.
61. European Court: Kyrtatos v. Greece, Application No. 41666/98, Judg-
ment of 22 May 2003.
62. European Court: Kyrtatos, §§ 52-54.
63. Francioni (2010), above n. 1, at 51.
Translated into the conceptualisation of sustainable
development presented above, the Kyrtatos case illus-
trates that the European Court did not consider the col-
lective aspects of the social pillar and thereby the envi-
ronmental pillar was overlooked. By narrowly focusing
on the individual social aspects, the Court instead pro-
moted the economic pillar, i.e. the interest of private
companies to exploit the wetland for economic gain.64
The problem from a sustainable development point of
view is not that the economic pillar was promoted, but
rather that the environmental pillar was not partaking in
the balancing, as the environmental destruction did not
interfere directly and severely with an individual right.
The necessity and proportionality test (hence the bal-
ancing part) of the court’s assessment requires an inter-
ference with a right. If there has been no interference, as
the Court concluded in the Kyrtatos case, the test if the
state has struck a fair balance between the individual
right and the collective interest will not be applied. One
of the keys to operationalising sustainable development
hence seems to be recognition of the collective dimen-
sion of individual rights, as it will facilitate the inclusion
of all pillars in the balancing between the conflicting
interests.
3.1.2 Interferences with Human Rights to Protect the
Environment
In the Fredin case,65 the European Court found no viola-
tion of the applicant’s right to property, Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. The Court held that Sweden had struck
a fair balance between the individual right (to extract
gravel from a property) and the general interest in envi-
ronmental protection.66 Again, the Court stated that
protection of the environment was an increasingly perti-
nent topic in today’s society.67 This was further illustra-
ted in the Posti and Rahko case,68 where the interference
with two fishermen’s right to possession under Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 was justified, since it fulfilled the
legitimate aim of preserving fish stocks. Moreover, the
measures were proportionate, as the applicants’ right to
fish was restricted, not completely banned and they
received compensation for the losses suffered.69 These
cases illustrate the clash between the individual econom-
ic interests of the applicants vs. the collective interest in
preserving the environment for future generations
(inter-generational, social aspects). Moreover, they
show that the European Court is not hesitant to give the
Contracting Parties a rather wide margin of appreciation
64. Francioni (2010), above n. 1, at 51; and Tladi (2007), above n. 21, at
87-90.
65. European Court: Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), Application No. 12033/86,
Judgment of 18 February 1991. The second Fredin case concerned the
right to fair and public hearing as provided by Art. 6(1) of the ECHR,
Fredin v. Sweden (No. 2), Application No. 18928/91, Judgment of 23
February 1994.
66. European Court: Fredin, §§ 51-56.
67. European Court: Fredin, § 48.
68. European Court: Posti and Rahko v. Finland, Application No.
27824/95, Judgment of 24 September 2002.
69. European Court: Posti and Rahko, §§ 76-78. The ECtHR held that the
right to fish in State-owned waters constituted a ‘possession’ and hence
fell in the scope of Art. 1 Protocol No. 1, § 76.
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when it comes to restricting economic rights to promote
the collective dimension of the environmental pillar, as
long as such measures are legitimate and proportionate.
In the Housing Association of War Disabled and Others,70
the European Court found that the withdrawal of build-
ing permits constituted control of property in the mean-
ing of Article 1(2) of Protocol No. 1 and it was thereby
an interference with the right to property. However, the
Court noted,
[I]n an area as complex and difficult as that of spatial
development, the Contracting States should enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation in order to implement
their town- and country-planning policy … Never-
theless, the Court cannot fail to exercise its power of
review and must determine whether the requisite bal-
ance was maintained in a manner consonant with the
applicants’ right of property.71
The European Court then stated that the state’s aim of
forest protection was legitimate, but that the measures
taken were disproportionate. Since the authorities had
withdrawn building permits from people who had
bought the land for the sole purpose of building homes,
and they were moreover not offered compensation or
new land, the Court concluded that there had been a
breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.72 In terms of sus-
tainable development, this case differs from the other
two where the right to property was restricted in the
name of the collective environmental pillar, since there
is a clear social pillar component (building homes). In
the previous cases, it was the individual economic inter-
ests of the applicants that were restricted (extraction of
gravel, fishing), which moreover were duly compensa-
ted.
Also in Hamer,73 the European Court found an interfer-
ence with the applicant’s right to property. It was reiter-
ated that the environment is not a value specifically pro-
tected by the ECHR, although the Court made a refer-
ence to the ‘living instrument’ doctrine:
The environment is a cause whose defence arouses
the constant and sustained interest of the public, and
consequently the public authorities. Financial imper-
atives and even certain fundamental rights, such as
ownership, should not be afforded priority over envi-
ronmental protection considerations, in particular
when the State has legislated in this regard. The pub-
lic authorities therefore assume a responsibility which
should in practice result in their intervention at the
appropriate time in order to ensure that the statutory
70. European Court: Housing Association of War Disabled and Victims of
War of Attica and Others v. Greece, Application No. 35859/02, Judg-
ment of 13 July 2006.
71. European Court: Housing Association of War Disabled and Others, §
37.
72. European Court: Housing Association of War Disabled and Others, §§
39-41.
73. European Court: Hamer v. Belgium, Application No. 21861/03, Judg-
ment of 27 November 2007.
provisions enacted with the purpose of protecting the
environment are not entirely ineffective.74
This was ground-breaking in the sense that the Europe-
an Court for the first time explicitly referred to the
environment as having a value in itself and that econom-
ic interests and even a fundamental right, the right to
property, should not be given priority over environmen-
tal interests.75 The Court found the demolition of the
applicant’s summerhouse to be a proportionate measure,
even though it was built almost thirty years ago. Due to
the fact that the only way to achieve the aim of a forest-
ed area without buildings was to restore the property
and demolish the house, the Court found that the state
had struck a fair balance between the environmental
interest and the individual right.76 This shows that the
European Court is not always disregarding the collective
approach. The context, however, should not be forgot-
ten. To restrict individual rights to promote the envi-
ronmental interest as a justification put forward by the
state is far less politically sensitive than attributing the
right to a clean environment to individual rights con-
tained in the ECHR. Nevertheless, the European Court
recognised the intrinsic value of the environment and it
is clear from Hamer that the individual social and eco-
nomic interests of the applicant were duly restricted in
the interest of preserving the environment for future
generations through recognising the collective aspect of
the environmental and social pillars.
3.2 The African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights77
(hereinafter ‘the ACHPR’) does, contrary to the other
two regional documents, contain an explicit right to a
clean environment, as well as a right to development.78
It does not, however, entail a provision on sustainable
development. As its European and Inter-American
counterparts, the African Commission does therefore
not refer to the concept of sustainable development as
such, even though it is more explicit in its elaborations
of the elements presented above. Two cases are relevant
in illustrating the African Commission’s contribution to
operationalising sustainable development, namely, the
case of Ogoniland79 and the Endorois case.80
74. European Court: Hamer, § 79.
75. Factsheet: Environmental-related cases in the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, available at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/
rdonlyres/0C818E19-C40B-412E-9856-44126D49BDE6/0/FICH-
ES_Environnement_EN.pdf> (last visited 28 Sep. 2012), at 6.
76. European Court: Hamer, §§ 86-89.
77. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27
June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982),
entered into force on 21 October 1986.
78. Artis. 22 and 25 ACHPR.
79. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Social and
Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria (‘Oginiland’), African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001).
80. African Commission: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)
and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v.
Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No.
276/03 (2009).
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The question for the African Commission in the case of
Ogoniland was about balancing different individual and
collective rights and interests. An oil consortium had
exploited oil in the Ogoniland area, resulting in severe
environmental destruction, such as soil, water and air
contamination. Moreover, the protesting Ogoni people
were met with immense violence, including attacks,
burning and destruction of villages and execution of
leaders by national security forces.81 The African Com-
mission pointed out that states have the right to exploit
oil and other natural resources in order to be able to
ensure the economic and social rights enshrined in the
ACHPR. However, the environmental and social inter-
ests of the Ogoni people was not sufficiently addressed
by the government, which moreover actively engaged in
violating the rights of Ogonis by attacking them and
destroying their villages.82 The measures taken by the
Nigerian authorities to ensure the economic interest
were hence not proportionate to the environmental and
social costs paid by the Ogoni people. In its analysis, the
Commission highlighted the importance of integrating
the different pillars:
These rights [to health and a clean environment] rec-
ognise the importance of a clean and safe environ-
ment that is closely linked to economic and social
rights in so far as the environment affects the quality
of life and safety of the individual. As has been right-
ly observed by Alexander Kiss, ‘an environment
degraded by pollution and defaced by the destruction
of all beauty and variety is as contrary to satisfactory
living conditions and the development as the break-
down of the fundamental ecologic equilibria is harm-
ful to physical and moral health.’83
The African Commission stepped away from the purely
individualistic language that its European counterpart is
using, recognising the collective dimension and the right
of the community as a whole to have the right to an
environment that is not unsustainably overexploited by
resource-extracting corporations.84
In the Endorois case, the complainants alleged violations
of a number of provisions due to the displacement of the
Endorois indigenous community through the creation
and re-gazetting of a game reserve.85 The group claimed
that their centuries-old traditional way of living was
intrinsically linked to the area around Lake Bogoria and
that the compensation they had been promised for the
relocation had not been implemented.86 The state con-
tested the status of the Endorois community as indige-
nous and thereby their claim to collective rights. The
African Commission disagreed and highlighted the
sacred relationship the group had with the land, as well
81. African Commission: Ogoniland, §§ 1-7.
82. African Commission: Ogoniland, §§ 53-54.
83. African Commission: Ogoniland, § 51.
84. Francioni (2010), above n. 1, at 51-52.
85. African Commission: Endorois, §§ 1, 3, 6.
86. African Commission: Endorois, §§ 10-12.
as self-identification as an indigenous group.87 More-
over, the Commission ‘draw inspiration’ from the pro-
gressive interpretation of the Inter-American Court in
the field of community rights (see below) and held that
even if indigenous groups have been affected by modern
society in their way of life, they may still fulfil the crite-
ria of ‘distinctiveness’ that entitles them to collective
rights.88
By relying on case law from the Inter-American, the
European Court, and other international human rights
bodies, the Commission found that the indigenous lands
of the Endorois had been severely and disproportionally
encroached upon, in violation of Article 14 (the right to
property).89 Even though the respondent state argued
that the Endorois people still had access to the land for
the purpose of obtaining food and engaging in certain
economic activities such as beekeeping and livestock
grazing, the African Commission held that such privi-
leges and restricted access ‘falls below internationally
recognised norms. The respondent state must grant title
to their territory in order to guarantee its permanent use
and enjoyment.’90 The state also raised wildlife manage-
ment and conservation as a justification to limit the
rights of the complainants.91 The African Commission
rejected that argument and held that ‘the Endorois – as
the ancestral guardians of that land – are best equipped
to maintain its delicate ecosystems’ and ‘continued dis-
possession and alienation from their ancestral land con-
tinues to threaten the cultural survival of the Endorois’
way of life, a consequence which clearly tips the propor-
tionality argument on the side of indigenous peoples
under international law.’92
The Commission exemplified application of the princi-
ple of intra-generational equity by rejecting the
respondent state’s argument that special treatment of
indigenous groups could be perceived as discriminatory.
The African Commission is of the view that the
Respondent State cannot abstain from complying
with its international obligations under the African
Charter merely because it might be perceived to be
discriminatory to do so. It is of the view that in cer-
tain cases, positive discrimination or affirmative
action helps to redress imbalance.93
The African Commission thereby recognised the impor-
tance of positive actions to address the situation of vul-
nerable people in society, in line with the principle of
intra-generational equity. This collective approach to
the social and economic interests of the Endorois com-
munity is crucial in the pursuit of sustainable develop-
87. African Commission: Endorois, §§ 155, 157.
88. African Commission: Endorois, §§ 158-162.
89. African Commission: Endorois, §§ 237-238. The Commission also found
the state to be in violation of Arts. 8 (right to religious freedom), 17
(right to culture), 21 (right to freely dispose wealth and natural resour-
ces) and 22 (right to development).
90. African Commission: Endorois, §§ 181, 186, 206.
91. African Commission: Endorois, § 178.
92. African Commission: Endorois, § 235.
93. African Commission: Endorois, § 196.
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ment and in stark contrast to the individual reasoning of
its European counterpart.
3.3 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court has mostly dealt with cases
concerning sustainable development in the context of
indigenous peoples.94 As mentioned above, the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights95 (hereinafter the
‘ACHR’) does not contain an explicit right to a clean
environment, but the Inter-American Court has none-
theless incorporated environmental rights in the scope
of its mandate through progressive treaty interpretation
even though the Court does not explicitly mention the
concept of sustainable development. Moreover, the col-
lective reasoning applied by the African Commission
can be traced also in the case law of the Inter-American
Court, which is remarkable since it does not explicitly
contain communitarian rights, as its African counterpart
does.
The first case concerning the right to ancestral lands
was filed on behalf of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community against Nicaragua.96 The Inter-American
Court held that the logging concessions awarded to pri-
vate companies in the communal lands of indigenous
peoples constituted a breach of the right to property,
Article 21 of the ACHR. Even though Article 21 does
not contain an explicit right to communal lands, the
Court concluded that indigenous groups have the right
to community entitlement and thereby the right to hunt,
fish, gather food and live by their cultural beliefs, with-
out having their land exploited by environmentally and
culturally destructive activities, such as commercial log-
ging.97
The Inter-American Court based its decision on the
preparatory works, which revealed that the phrasing
‘enjoyment of private property’ was changed to ‘enjoy-
ment of his property’ and thereby taking away the indi-
vidualistic phrasing of the provision. Moreover, the
Court stressed that the ACHR is a ‘living instrument’98
that must be interpreted in the light of present-day con-
ditions and that Article 29(b) of the ACHR prohibited a
restrictive interpretation of the rights guaranteed by the
Convention.99 The Inter-American Court clearly recog-
nised all three pillars, since it added the environmental
pillar to its analysis through progressive treaty interpre-
tation. In terms of balancing, the Court focused on the
collective aspects of the social and environmental pillar,
which in this case outweighed the individual economic
94. T. Buergenthal and D. Shelton, ‘Contentious Cases before the Court’, in
Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and Materials (1995).
95. American Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 22 November
1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123; 9 ILM 99 (1969).
96. Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001).
97. Inter-American Court: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, §§
145-155.
98. Referring to its European counterpart, see Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Ting-
ni Community, § 145. See also Inter-American Court: Yakye Axa Indig-
enous Community, § 125.
99. Inter-American Court: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, §§
145-148.
interests of the logging companies, as their loss could
more easily be compensated for in monetary terms.
The Inter-American Court elaborated further on the
interpretation methods of Article 21 in the Yakye Axa
Indigenous Community case.100 With a reference to the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,101 the
Court stated that not only should the provisions directly
related to the ACHR be considered, but also instru-
ments that are related to the human rights system as
such. In the present case for instance, the International
Labour Organisation (hereinafter ‘ILO’) Convention
No. 169102 was deemed appropriate to consider in the
context of communal property rights. The Inter-Ameri-
can Court specifically referred to Article 13 of the ILO
Convention, which provides that special attention shall
be given to the cultural and spiritual values of the indig-
enous groups and their relationship to the territories on
which they live, especially the collective aspects of such
values. In the light of this, the Inter-American Court
declared that Article 21 must be interpreted as requiring
states to safeguard the traditional lands and the natural
resources therein and to make sure that this right is
effectively realised, something that Paraguay failed to do
in this case.103 The Inter-American Court further stated
that the right to communal property of ancestral lands
includes preservation of cultural values, as well as the
transmission of such values to future generations, i.e.
referring to the principle of inter-generational equity,
without further legal justification why this principle
should be incorporated in this context.104
The clash between current property owners and indige-
nous peoples became apparent in the Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community case,105 and once again the Inter-
American Court recognised the collective dimension of
Article 21. It stated that current possession of land was
not a requirement, if, as in the present case, the indige-
nous group unwillingly had had to leave its territory,
which subsequently was transferred to third parties.
The right to restitution of such land, according to the
Court, does not cease only because the indigenous group
is no longer fishing, hunting or gathering if they are
hindered to do so for reasons beyond their control. The
Court held that as long as the relationship between the
traditional lands and the spiritual and material identity
of the indigenous group exists, the right to restitution
should be enforceable.106 The Inter-American Court
hence recognised the collective social values of the
100. Inter-American Court: Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,
Judgment of 17 June 2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 125 (2005).
101. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 ILM 1969,
at 679.
102. Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force on
5 September 1991.
103. Inter-American Court: Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, §§ 136-140,
152-156.
104. Inter-American Court: Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, § 124.
105. Inter-American Court: Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community of the
Enxet People v. Paraguay, Case 0322/2001, Report No. 12/03, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 Doc. 70 rev. 2 at 378 (2003).
106. Inter-American Court: Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community of the
Enxet People, §§ 125-134.
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indigenous groups, which are more difficult to compen-
sate than third-party economic claims. By doing so, it
opened up for integration of the three pillars through
promoting the collective dimension of the social and
environmental pillars, while leaving it open for the eco-
nomic interests of third parties to be satisfied through
economic reimbursement.
Moreover, since the Sawhoyamaxa group did not have
access to its lands, the situation had become very seri-
ous, with a number of deaths and numerous people get-
ting ill from living next to a national road. The Inter-
American Court stated that vulnerable people should be
given high priority when it comes to the implementation
of Article 4(1) of the IACHR, the right to a life in digni-
ty. The Court found that Paraguay violated this provi-
sion, since it failed to take positive actions to protect the
Sawhoyamaxa community members.107 This is an exam-
ple of how the principle of intra-generational equity has
been applied in practice. The Inter-American Court
recognised the vulnerable situation of the indigenous
group and how measures to protect such groups must be
effectively implemented.
In the Saramaka People case,108 the Inter-American
Court established that not only indigenous peoples, but
also tribal communities can have profound relationships
with their ancestral lands, even if they settled there as
late as the 17th and 18th centuries. Thereby, they also
have the right to communal property in accordance with
Article 21.109 The Inter-American Court referred to a
number of international conventions110 and reiterated
that State Parties to the IACHR have due diligence obli-
gations to ensure that indigenous and tribal peoples’
rights are effectively protected so that their social, eco-
nomic and cultural survival is guaranteed and preserved
in order to be able to transmit their distinct traditions to
future generations.111 The Inter-American Court con-
cluded that the mining and logging concessions awarded
by Suriname violated the right to natural resources on
communal land.
[T]he right to use and enjoy their territory would be
meaningless in the context of indigenous and tribal
communities if said right were not connected to the
natural resources that lie on and within the land.
That is, the demand for collective land ownership by
members of indigenous and tribal peoples derives
from the need to ensure the security and permanence
of their control and use of the natural resources,
which in turn maintains their very way of life.112
107. Inter-American Court: Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community of the
Enxet People, §§ 162-163, 178.
108. Inter-American Court: Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of 28
November 2007, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 172 (2007).
109. Inter-American Court: Saramaka People, §§ 85-86, 132-133. See also
Inter-American Court: Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment of
15 June 2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 124 (2005), on the
rights of tribal communities.
110. Including common Art. 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
111. Inter-American Court: Saramaka People, § 95.
112. Inter-American Court: Saramaka People, § 122.
Again, this quote illustrates the collective language that
the Inter-American Court uses in the context of indige-
nous peoples. In this case, the economic interest of the
tribal community of small-scale logging and trade as
part of their economic organisation, clashed with the
economic interest of the State and logging companies to
engage in large-scale logging. The Court therefore
looked at environmental impact reports of the respective
logging activities, which revealed that the large-scale
logging had devastating effects on the environment,
leaving large areas ruined for animals and farming, while
the small-scale logging by the tribe did not have such
negative effects.113 Moreover, large-scale logging could
potentially endanger the tribe’s traditional way of life,
contrary to Article 21 and the right to possess resources
that are necessary for the cultural, social and economic
survival of the tribe.114 This case is a good example of
how the different dimensions of the three pillars are rec-
ognised and balanced to reach the most sustainable out-
come.
Also the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has followed the footsteps of the Inter-American Court
regarding progressive treaty interpretation when envi-
ronmental destruction is threatening the rights of indig-
enous peoples. In the Yanomami Indians case,115 the
Commission held that Brazil violated the right to life
and physical integrity when constructing a highway
through ancestral lands of indigenous peoples. Similar-
ly, the Inter-American Commission concluded that the
life support on which the indigenous community relied
upon was endangered because of the logging conces-
sions awarded by the Belize authorities in the Maya
Indigenous Community of Toledo case. The Commission
found a violation of the claimants right to communal
property, even though it pointed out the importance of
economic development.116
These cases regarding communal property rights show
that the San José Court is not hesitant to engage in pro-
gressive treaty interpretation of the ACHR, by referring
to preparatory works, case law of other human rights
bodies, international human rights law in general and
other documents that relate to the subject matter. The
language used by the Inter-American Court further-
more shows that it is more concerned about the collec-
tive aspects of the rights than its European counterpart.
Moreover, the Inter-American Court has showed that
the principles of intra-generational and inter-genera-
tional equity can be operationalised in the context of
human rights. In terms of the three pillars, the cases
illustrate that the Inter-American Court has used the
principles of inter-generational and intra-generational
113. Inter-American Court: Saramaka People, §§ 150-151.
114. Inter-American Court: Saramaka People, §§ 130-135.
115. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Yanomami Indians; The
Human Rights Situation of the Indigenous People in the Americas,
Inter-Am. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, Doc. 62 (2000).
116. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Maya indigenous com-
munity of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004). Ref-
erencing the above mentioned Ogoniland case from the African Com-
mission, see § 149.
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equity when balancing the three pillars. The Court rec-
ognised the collective dimension of the pillars and that
such interests are more difficult to compensate than
individual economic interests and that they therefore
should be given priority.
4 Concluding Remarks
This article uses a generally accepted conceptualisation
of sustainable development that can be, and has been,
operationalised through judicial reasoning. The concep-
tualisation focuses on the potentially incompatible indi-
vidual and collective dimensions of the environmental,
economic and social pillars, and the principles of inter-
generational and intra-generational equity. Case law
from the three regional human rights bodies (the Euro-
pean, the African and the Inter-American) is analysed in
order to reveal how they have wrestled the individual
and collective dimensions of the elements of sustainable
development and what legal arguments they used in
order to do so. The human rights bodies do not explicit-
ly refer to sustainable development, but they have all
incorporated the elements thereof to a certain extent.
The fact that human rights courts deal with the envi-
ronmental pillar, even those that are not explicitly man-
dated to do so, shows that human rights courts have cre-
ated an institutional framework that is dealing not only
with human rights, but also with environmental con-
cerns to a certain extent. This means that other areas of
law that do not yet have such institutional structure
might use, or have used, this well-established frame-
work to deal with claims.
The European Court acknowledged that environmental
concerns are increasingly important in today’s society
(referring to its ‘living instrument’ doctrine) and effec-
tively connected certain environmental destruction to
the right to life, and the right to private and family life.
In terms of balancing the three pillars, the European
jurisprudence shows that the economic pillar cannot
outweigh the individual dimension of the social and
environmental pillars, i.e. economic interests cannot be
used as a justification if a person can show environmen-
tal destruction that directly and severely infringes a
right and thereby prohibits an individual from effective-
ly enjoying his or her right. However, the analysis also
showed that the European Court has been hesitant in
recognising the collective dimension of the social and
environmental pillars in cases regarding an infringement
of a right due to environmental destruction. By failing
to recognise the importance of the collective dimension,
the balancing of the three pillars became askew, since
the environmental dimension of the collective social
right was excluded from the balancing test. This might
be a sign of the political context in which the European
Court works. With an enormous backlog of cases, it
might be hesitant to step too far outside its mandate and
attract even more claims.117 Moreover, collective rights,
or recognition of collective rights, are outside the legal
cultural and constitutional heritage in Europe and the
context of human rights.118 The European Court might
therefore not be the ideal institution for operationalising
sustainable development. However, given the situation
with few ideally suited courts or quasi-courts dealing
with sustainable development claims from individuals,
this analysis at least shows that sustainable development
has been operationalised to a certain extent by the Euro-
pean Court.
The other two regional institutions illustrate how the
collective dimensions of the three pillars can be incorpo-
rated in a human rights context. Thereby, the pillars
were all considered in the balancing process and the
court or quasi-court was in a better position to make an
objective evaluation of which pillar(s) were reasonable to
put at fore and how the other(s) could be accounted for.
By doing so, the African Commission and the Inter-
American Court effectively operationalised sustainable
development through judicial reasoning and illustrated a
way of fulfilling the aim of balancing the sometimes-
contradictory aims of the three pillars. The fact that
human rights courts have operationalised the concept of
sustainable development to a certain extent creates the
impression that other courts or quasi-courts, such as the
World Bank Inspection Panel, the Aarhus Compliance
Committee, or even the World Trade Organisation Dis-
pute Settlement Body, could do the same.
117. On backlog of cases, see M. O’Boyle, ‘On Reforming the Operation of
the European Court of Human Rights’, European Human Rights Law
Review 1, at 1 (2008), R. Wolfrum and U. Deutsch, The European
Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and
Possible Solutions (2009), A. Buyse, ‘The Pilot Judgment Procedure at
the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and Challenges’, 57
Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal) (2009).
118. F. Wieacker, ‘Foundations of European Legal Culture’, 38 American
Journal of Comparative Law (1990), at 20-23 and G. Bierbrauer,
‘Toward and Understanding of Legal Culture: Variations in Individual-
ism and Collectivism between Kurds, Lebanese, and Germans’, 28 Law
and Society Review at 251-252 (1994). On collective rights and inter-
ests generally, see, e.g., D.G. Newman, ‘Collective Interests and Collec-
tive Rights’, 49 The American Journal of Jurisprudence, at 127 (2004)
and D. Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 Human Rights Quarterly at 377
(1991).
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